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Monday, December 13th, 2004
10:41 pm	Counter Terrorism: USE/LIMITS OF MILITARY - Tactical Advantages of Terrorists: in dealing with terrorist we can pre-empt the attack (pre-emption) or retaliate it (retaliation) but it is very important to be proportional in order to meet desired domestic and international public opinion. On the other hand, it is hard to pre-empt future attacks. - Elements of a military strategy: o Proportional Responses: if you have already been attacked and your public opinion has been affected, you may follow a new “normal” way of dealing with terrorists, - not necessarily proportionally, as it is in Iraq. o How to Handle Casualties: until 9/11 US invaded small countries by sending very limited member of soldiers abroad. There was no sense of immediate threat which helped to soften public opinion after 9/11. The government became freer in acting. But how elastic is public opinion by casualties? o Collateral Damage: we do not want to kill civilians at least because we do not want to make enemies. But when you are fighting insurgency (asymmetrical threat), how are you going to filter civilians? This can push civilians to join terrorist groups and resist army. You can deal with terrorist like does Israel by collectively punishing (forcing civilians to stay at home for one week, burning their houses, striking buildings, etc.). But Israelis example seems to be not very useful in a long-time period. Nevertheless, in a short time Israelis tactics work. But when the curve of terrorist activity is lifted, the wall will not probably be very successful. - Political, Military and Economic Allies: Al-Qaeda is a global threat; US forces are stretched over the world which means that US need trustable allies around the world. Al-Qaeda is more decentralized which means that you can’t send army but you may have to rely on a given state. Before the 9/11 there were more people ready to entertain the idea of preemption. Alliances are quite strong and they can help to combat terrorism. - Hearts and Minds: in a long term is the only solution (like it was during the Cold War when US spread its values) that can encourage people to create democracy and push the economic development. (Comment on this)
Friday, December 10th, 2004
12:11 am	Succeeds and Failures of US Policy Towards Al-Qaeda In this paper I will discuss some failures and successes of the policy of the United States oriented towards Al-Qaeda. In the second half of this paper I will also highlight some possible counterterrorism measures against Osama bin Laden’s group. The understanding of failures and successes of the US Administration towards Al-Qaeda can not be separated from some historical moments. As we know September 11 was not the first time that Osama bin Laden’s group had launched terrorist attacks inside the United States. If we go to the history, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was coordinated by Al-Qaeda’s leaders. In addition, there also were other bin Laden’s network actions, such as assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995, the destruction of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the simultaneous bombing of American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998 and the bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in 2000.1 So, I consider that these incidents should have been wake-up calls for the increasing threat posed by Islamic radical movements. However, they remain comparably unnoticed and largely ignored by the greater U.S. public and government which did not understand the gravity of the threat.2 History also shows that American Administration failed to see in these terrorist attacks the threat to national security.3 Therefore, I conclude that US officials responsible for national security, including CIA and FBI, failed to formulate a cohesive and systematic policy for preventing bin Laden’s network attacks in the future. According to the US 9/11 commission’s report, the FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field to national priorities.4 Moreover, I consider the US and UK role in stimulating the development of what was called MAK (from its Arabic name Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab) during the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan to be rather important for more detailed studying.5 Indeed, the US intelligent services’ failure to predict the development of Afghanis insurgency groups into, largely, terrorist organizations in 1980s was crucial not only for the national security of United States but also for the socio-political atmosphere in the region. The fact that America, maybe unwillingly, posed itself as a competitor to Islamic world also seems worth paying attention at. The terrorist attacks of September 11 have created a situation in which the United States is likely to unwittingly find itself in, to some extent, confrontation with the Muslim world. As Ehsan Ahrari, an Independent Security Analyst, puts it a number of Muslim countries are siding with the US now. He also asserts: “What is sorely missing is a realization in Washington that it is not likely to win an all-out war against terrorism and still maintain the political status quo in a number of Muslim countries of the Middle East and South, West, and even Central Asia. Once Islamist radicals oust one or more governments as an unintended consequence of the US war on terrorism, one can only imagine how explosive those regions would become”. 6 In addition, many tend to connect negative attitudes to the United States among Muslims with the US invasion to Iraq: “there has been a catastrophic decline in trust in the US and rising anger because of the war in Iraq and the way the US forces have been operating there.”7 To this end, United States is perceived to be waging a war on Islam, not just terrorists and, therefore, America has contributed to bin Laden’s increased creditability in the Arab world. It is necessary understand that there was not only clash of civilizations but, if you will, clash within civilization. Bush’s unilateral doctrine aroused strong criticism from many European governments that had expressed warm sympathy for the United States after September 11 and had supported the war in Afghanistan: “From Paris to Moscow and Beijing to Brasilia, genuine sympathy with America seems to have been transformed into a groundswell of unease about the nature of American power and how it is being projected.”8 Another important factor is the issue of financial support of terrorist groups. US intelligence was constantly working on bin Laden’s financial links, making international measures fairly successful in the formal financial sector. Nevertheless, the freezing of millions of dollars associated with terrorism has only served to drive Al-Qaeda diversify: “The group has exchanged currency for gold and diamonds. Which are easier to hide and smuggle across borders, and increased its reliance on informal money transfers, known as hawalas, that are virtually untraceable. Cells are also able to raise funds independently through legitimate and illegitimate businesses, drug smuggling, and other petty crimes”. 9 Since September 11, the Bush Administration has led a global counteroffensive that has deprived Al-Qaeda of its sanctuary in Afghanistan and, probably, in Iraq, captured or killed 75 percent of its leadership, reduced its ability to raise funds and have well developed training camp system. 10 I would notice that these successes seem to be rather contradictive simply because allied troops still face attacks almost every day both in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fact that many of group’s high rank members were captured of course deserves honor but, on the other hand, it forced Al-Qaeda to make radical changes in its structure and, therefore, disperse. In addition, “removing the titular head of Al-Qaeda may feel good for Americans bent on vengeance, but it could prove irrelevant to reducing the threat to the United States because of the near total transformation of the terrorist menace over the past three years”.11 Indeed, one of the major problems while dealing with Al-Qaeda is its ability to regroup, decentralize and move outside Afghanistan. This creates a greater difficulty in collecting reliable intelligence, as the paths of communication are increasingly unfamiliar, the personalities are changing, and the locations of operatives are more diffuse.12 J. T. Caruso, Acting Assistant Director at Counter Terrorism Division, asserts: “It is one thing to disrupt an organization such as Al-Qaeda, it is another to totally dismantle and destroy it. This must truly remain an international effort, with international cooperation on all levels, in order to be successful. All agencies within the U.S. government must remain vigilant, and must continue to cooperate and work together, in order to truly eradicate this scourge to all mankind everywhere known as Al-Qaeda.”13 Moreover, referring to results of Iraqi campaign (which had not really verifiable arguments for existence) it is possible to conclude that Al-Qaeda cells begun to successfully operate in Iraq and the fact that American forces are having to fight so fiercely inside major cities, 18 months after “liberating” Iraq from Saddam Hussein, is a sign of how close Mr. Bush’s Iraq policy is teetering towards failure.14 Finally, some experts also believe that “there has been a spike in recruitment to the network as a result of the US military operations and Iraq, leading to a worry that, despite its serious recent looses, Al Qaeda could grow stronger in future months.”15 Now, after highlighting some failures and relative successes of the US policy towards Al-Qaeda, I would like to continue on possible tactics and strategies which, from my point of view, will be worth while dealing with Osama bin Laden’s group in the future. First of all, America needs some kind of unified counter terrorism that would accumulate and analyze incoming terrorism-related information to any US agency. The responsibilities of this center should also include development of antiterror strategy which will leave terrorists with few resources and little hope of success, if not exhaust them. The terrorist organizations associated with and including Al-Qaeda, should be constantly monitored and, if necessary, America should be ready to attack preemptively “if they seem ready to strike United States”.16 But such readiness and acts of preemption should fit the frames of international law which is, as we know, does not always reflects the realities of our days. Therefore, it will be beneficial for America if it manages to correct some articles of, say UN Charter, connected with self defense and use of force. Nevertheless, while trying to achieve such changes in order to legitimately fight terrorism United States should also discuss its goals and probably make some bilateral agreements with not only Western powers. In addition, I agree with Barry R. Posen, a professor of political science in the Security Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who states the following: “The United Nations must be involved in every step. Resort to law must take precedence over tactical advantage. Terrorists must be treated like criminals, not enemies: Police should apprehend them; courts should try them. Military action should occur seldom if at all, and it should always be precise. A state that sponsors terrorism, …, should be diplomatically isolated, condemned at the UN, subjected to an arms embargo, and economically sanctioned in any way that does not harm the general populace. The United States should join the international criminal court, and as a token of its good intentions sign most of the treaties it has eschewed.” In general, most immediate measures should include the following: - Completely destroy group’s leadership structure. - Try to pressure such countries as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to maximize their efforts to capture Al-Qaeda members and supporters. - Maintain relentless pressure, including economic sanctions, on the state sponsors of terrorism to halt their support for terrorist groups (Syria, Sudan, Iran). - It is also necessary to affect public opinion by letting the counterterrorism measures include some elements of public information.17 For example, the use of so called psyops strategy, “linking Al-Qaeda to the very narcotics that have been ruled as unholy by Islamic clerics, could potentially weaken some of Al-Qaeda’s legitimacy with the young men who in their most impressionable years are shaped by extremist education.”18 - America’s officials responsible for counterterrorism activity should develop some defense-oriented measures of homeland security. This means that United States should also pay more vigilance to the safer “transportation, energy, power, and communication systems and closer attention to the security of government buildings”.19 Notes: 1. Mark Burgess, Anthony Keats and Colin McCullough. “Al-Qaeda (The Base)”. Center for Defense Information, December 30, 2002. 2. I must admit that one of the announced goals of Clinton’s Administration in mid-1990s was the defeating of terrorism threats but these goals were not clearly prioritized and, therefore, measures remained rather ineffective. 3. Harry Henderson. “Terrorist Challenge to America”. Facts On File, Inc, NY, 2003, p. 10. 4. “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upopn the United States”, p. 77. 5. Charlmers Johnson. “Blowback from U.S. foreign Policy Is Partially to Blame for the Attacks”. “The attack on America: September 11, 2001”. William Dudley, book editor. Greenhaven Press, San Diego, 2002, p.35. 6. Ehsan Ahrari. “U.S. vs the Growing Turulence in Muslim Countries”. Center for Defense Information, November 29, 2001. 7. James Strengold. “Capturing bin Laden won’t end al Qaeda’s threat, experts say. He’s now a symbol, not a solo strategist, in evolving network”. www.SFgate.com, September 6, 2004. 8. John Rossant. “Despite the Griping, Support for the U.S. runs Deep”. Business Week, September 16, 2002, p. 46. 9. Mark Burgess, Anthony Keats and Colin McCullough. “Al-Qaeda (The Base)”. Center for Defense Information, December 30, 2002. 10. Mark Burgess, Anthony Keats and Colin McCullough. “Al-Qaeda (The Base)”. Center for Defense Information, December 30, 2002. 11. James Strengold. “Capturing bin Laden won’t end al Qaeda’s threat, experts say. He’s now a symbol, not a solo strategist, in evolving network”. www.SFgate.com, September 6, 2004. 12. Audrey Kurth Cronin. “Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict”. CRS Report for Congress, May 23, 2003. 13. "Al-Qaeda International". Testimony of J. T. Caruso, Acting Assistant Director, CounterTerrorism Division, FBI Before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate December 18, 2001. 14. Leaders: After Fallujah; America in Iraq”. The Economist. London, November 13, 2004. 15. Audrey Kurth Cronin. “Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict”. CRS Report for Congress, May 23, 2003. 16. Barry R. Posen. “The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and tactics”. In the book of Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer “Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding New Security Environment”. McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. 17. Uzi Dayan. “Strategic Ramifications of the September 2001 Terror Attacks”, a lecture delivered at ICT Conference in Solidarity with the United States of America: Terrorism post September 11, 2002, held at Herzliya, September 11, 2002. 18. Barry R. McCaffrey, John A. Basso. “Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Crime: The Convergence Phenomenon”. In the book of Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer “Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding New Security Environment”. McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. 19. Barry R. Posen. “The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and tactics”. In the book of Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer “Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding New Security Environment”. McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004. (Comment on this)
12:10 am	Counter-Terrorism: USE/LIMITS OF MILITARY - Terrorism as “asymmetrical warfare”: terrorists have tactical advantages and we are, to large extent, going to play defense. From the military point of view, there is a mismatch between large military force with conventional tactics and small, not very well equipped groups without conventional tactics. - Counter-Terrorist Forces: o Conventional: probably the best example of use of military force against terrorists is Afghanistan when US troops basically captured and controlled state. o To soften terrain and prepare it for Special Forces to send in. US military is not ready to fight insurgency because Pentagon switched its strategy after Vietnam War to fast lightening strikes strategy or exit-strategy under the Powel Doctrine (to win and withdraw from country as soon as possible). - Special Forces: the US has long history of fighting unconventional war (native Indians, Korea, and Vietnam). Special Forces were updated under the Kennedy Administration because he was afraid that USSR would begin communist insurgent war around the world. Small mobile forces were created; to be able to move quickly Special Forces were given special equipment such as helicopters. Then back to 1970s everything that was negative about Vietnam was associated with Special Forces. After that Reagan Administration rehabilitated Special Forces and increased their funding. Special Forces work with specific missions – going after someone (association, destruction of bases, etc.). On the other hand Special Forces largely depend on intelligence (if it’s bad, mission fails). Another limitation is political (when Pentagon resisted Clinton to send Special Forces to Africa and kill or capture bin Laden). There are also bureaucratic divisions within Pentagon. Finally, Ramsfeld wanted to move SF on the top of traditional military kinds of bureaucratic rivalries, making them to coordinate the attacks of military, navy or air forces. (1 Comment |Comment on this)
12:10 am	Counter-Terrorism: Re-Organizing Government. - Problems in Pre-9/11 Organization: o Federal, State and Local divisions: US are federal state, i.e. it is decentralized system. There are a lot of duplications (CIA, FBI, etc.) that lead to different strategies of different levels of government. o Intelligence Sharing: FBI, CIA, NSC, etc. o Political Leadership and Terrorism: during the times of Clinton Administration terrorism was not seen as a main threat. It is much harder to mobilize public opinion. - Department of Homeland Security: o Coordination of Local, State and Federal institutions. After 9/11 the first idea of reaction was about some person at the level of White House who would be responsible for the Homeland Security. In addition, now every state has its own office of homeland security. o Scientific/Technical Security Research: the Department of Homeland Security provides funds for researches to develop new means of combating terrorism. o Intelligence Sharing: of the main issues is boarder control, - now US have one-umbrella organization responsible for it. o Interdiction of material and people. o Public Health Surveillance: use of newly developed monitors of chemical materials in public places. o One of the biggest was creation of the Northern Command that supposed to coordinate forces to protect North America as a whole under 1 command. Now civilian plane is not only can be crashed because of the President’s order but also because of the Head of Northern Command. It can also coordinate resources with Intelligence services if nuclear attack appears. - The Role of Posse Comitatus: Police now can react similarly to the Army’s ways of reaction. - Intelligence: o A Domestic Intelligence Agency? Should US come out with some kind of domestic intelligence agency like MI-5 in UK that would be focused on domestic threats to security? - Institutional Policies: o The Role of Judiciary. o The Role of the President. o The Role of the Congress. - Public Opinion: o Limits and Information. o Social, regional, gender differences. (Comment on this)
12:09 am	Counter-Terrorism: Strategies and Tactics, Intelligence in Counter-Terrorism - Intelligence in Counter-Terrorism: o Organization: CIA, NSA, DIA. The Defense Intelligence Agency gathers mostly military information in order to provide army with appropriate informing and predicting. But they probably do more. The NSA mostly gathers information just by listening (was especially active during the Cold War). But they collect everything and, therefore, make themselves overinformed. The CIA was created as a central mechanism for controlling all the information but over years it became a big bureaucratic machine and CIA now, perhaps, at its lowest points. o It is possible to gather intelligence by electronics means, personal contacts by the help of covered person. - Intelligence Analysis consists of Gathering, Combating Groupthink and Scenario’s Building. It is necessary to avoid groupthink. - Lessons for Intelligence in 9/11: o Secondary National Security Challenge. o Lack of Agency Coordination. o Lack of Human Intelligence (absence of agents in Iraq before invasion). o Limited Analysis Capability (lack of Arab speaking experts). o It is also very hard for Intelligence services to contradict with policies preferable for White House. - Limits and Dangers in Operations: o Violations/Abuses of Domestic and Int’l Law in the name of National Security. o False Information: double agent problem. o Manipulated Information. (Comment on this)
12:09 am	Counter-Terrorism: Strategies and Tactics - The Cost of Primacy: US are economic hegemon, but the gap between US and other competitors is eroding. US are military hegemon for sure. After the collapse the idea of “primacy for cheap the idea of “primacy for cheap” aroused but American officials were arguing weather US should be involved in military conflicts or not. But one of the problems of being hegemon is that others tend to condemn hegemon in every trouble. That is because hegemon has most of the world’s power. In addition, being a hegemon means that there is a big resistance from countless groups. - Tactics: o Offense-Defense theory: using three keys, - technology, organization and military doctrine, - to try to figure out what proportional advantage your enemy has and you will probably have if the clash appears. This theory tries to come out with some sort of exchange ratio in order to help to win the war (10:1 people for example). o Targets and Training: Tactical Advantage. Terrorists always have tactical advantage because they choose targets (and there are many potential targets that need protection) and training. In this light the vulnerability of the country is affected by these factors. o Deterrence and Proportionality: deterrence is effective at the level of arms race between states. Anyway, deterrence can work with state sponsoring terrorism. The groups that are not sponsored are much harder to deter. So, traditional military doctrine does not work with terrorists. The way to get out from disadvantage is preemption that helps to gain tactical success over terrorists. But it is necessary to be sure that preemption is proportional. This becomes a major source of critique of US policy towards Iraq. It is necessary to weight the immediacy of threat and the probability of terrorist attacks. - Terrorists: Tactical Advantage, Strategic Failure? The Case of bin Laden. The reality is that Al-Qaeda does not speak for most Muslims in the Middle East (even if it claims so). Al-Qaeda also does not seem to have necessary resources to keep on particular level. Terrorist strategy never succeeds as a strategy because of the violence. Strategically, violence can’t succeed as a strategy. (Comment on this)
Wednesday, November 10th, 2004
9:52 am	Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Crime Summary of “Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Crime: The Convergence Phenomenon” (by Barry R. McCaffrey, General, USA [Retired], John A. Basso, Major, USA, 2003) Criminal organizations are increasingly linked to each other and form a global criminal network, then a terrorist who taps into this network will gain extraordinary reach. In the post Cold-War era, the United States, as the only remaining superpower, became the natural target for blame. Since the Cold War superpower state sponsorship, ideological insurgents have had to look for alternative ways to raise funds. The ability to use the chaos wrought by terrorism and insurgency to produce coca or opium and then move narcotics through the soft borders created by the collapse of the USSR is tempting. Criminal organizations have preestablished networks to move and sell narcotics and launder money. Some terrorist organizations transform themselves to be able to conduct criminal activities in-house so that they can generate their own revenue. Generally terrorist are trying to increase the scope of their carnage in each successive campaign of attacks. This observation holds true not just for extremist terrorist groups but also for the ethno-nationalist groups. To this end, gaining international attention is vital to their cause, i.e. to get the world’s attention – to win – dramatic bloodshed is necessary. Both single spectacular attacks and sustained operations may require large amounts of cash. Almost each of terrorist group has to some degree pursued criminal activities to fund its ultimate goals. Insurgent groups differ from terrorist groups. We define terrorist groups as those who have crossed a line and chosen to target innocent civilians for psychological impact. Once this line crossed, they are more willing to expand their range of funding sources and the nature of their attacks. The new breed of extremist terror groups significantly differ in their aims from ethno-nationalist groups and in their use of terror as not just as isolated tactic, but as an all-encompassing strategy to gain the change they seek. Collier, director of the Development Research Group of the World Bank, has examined civil wars since 1965 to determine if evidence exists to support the popular perception that rebels begin civil wars to rid their state of an unjust regime, or if instead rebels simply aspire to criminal wealth. Economic agendas have a greater role in the incidence and continuation of civil war than does grievance. Based on the conclusions of Chris Dishman that the costs of collaboration outweigh the benefits, cooperation between the two groups (criminal and terrorist) may occur, but it will be short-lived. He states that terrorist and criminal organizations will continue to shy away from collaborative arrangements, because their aims and motivations are different than those of the potential collaborators. Different groups will instead choose to remain on authentic political or criminal course. However, criminal motives and the lure of profit will transform the aims of some terrorist leaders. This transformation towards profit-making blurs the distinction violence used to advance political aims and that used to increase revenue. He warns: “Terrorist and guerrilla groups who view their cause as futile, might turn their formidable assets towards crime – all the while under a bogus political banner.” By failing to distinguish between insurgent groups and terrorists or between different types of terrorist groups, and by failing to recognize that historical cases miss the complexity of the modern relationship between organized crime and terrorists, we believe that Dishman has missed the meaningful convergence relationship between these dangerous organizations. We must sort out which terrorist groups will transform themselves to take on the capabilities of a profit-driven criminal group, and which terrorist groups will remain true to their ideological cause. Three general outcomes exist for terrorist organizations for their dealings with criminal organizations. Terrorists organizations may converge, meaning form a partnership with criminal organizations; terrorists may transform themselves into quasi-criminal organizations; or they may maintain themselves as pure terrorist organizations. First, terrorist groups must identify whether they intend to seek a future legitimate governance role. Many new groups are extremist in nature instead of ethno-nationalist and will generally not seek a role in state governance. Second, all terrorist groups must determine whether their followers will continue to support them if they pursue criminal activities to gain revenue or resources for future terror attacks (their ability to interact with criminal organizations may be constrained). Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) participated in criminal activities that its followers supported, but only in an effort to fund Abimael Guzman’s bizarre Maoist vision. Sendero never lost its desire to govern. On the other hand, we would suggest that the FARC, after determining that it could not play an active role in the Colombian state, fully transformed itself and turned its focus almost exclusively to profit via criminal activity. In doing so, the FARC lost all but the most determined of its ideological followers. The vital type of typology is the differentiation between modern extremist terrorist organizations and those that are of the traditional ethno-nationalist type. Extremist groups do not seek an active role in governing a state. These groups always believe that ends justify the means and this likely leads to collaboration with criminals. Terrorist groups are particularly well suited to the task of narcotics production since the chaotic environment they create will lead to lawlessness and the ability to conduct illicit business. Terrorist groups involved in drug activity gain a monopoly on the control of land for the growing of coca or opium. The behavior of both terrorist groups and their criminal partners becomes congruent. But criminal groups try to avoid partnering with terrorists because of the question of scope of violence. Terrorists, even those seeking a legitimate role in state, are willing to cross the lines that many citizens see as sacrosanct. Criminal organizations, or at the least some of their operatives, will also not be queasy about the mass casualty situations that they would create through the sale of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) material to terrorists. (Comment on this)
Tuesday, November 9th, 2004
9:17 pm	Terrorist Strategy: Cyberterrorism Cyberterrorism: - Definition: Disruption and Destruction; Espionage or Communication by Groups. Terrorists use new technologies and by doing so they bring their actions on a higher level. Computer networks are very important for financing, communication and spreading fear. Is it terrorism? (Political goals, element of violence) - Fear and Terror vs. Nuisance (most of cyberterrorism scenarios don’t have a violent element). Methods: - Disrupt and Corrupt Information/Infrastructure. - Destruction of Information/Infrastructure. - Hacker/Espionage Information. Terrorists can also try to access some informational internet storages of companies or agencies and try to prevent or disrupt its flow. It is not only about financing or information, they can also try to access, say, hospital blood banks, air traffic systems and destroy all the information (but destruction is less an issue for big companies which usually have back-up offices). Trying to get to the systems is difficult but not impossible. During the Bosnian War it is believed that the most important hacker threats were coming from different laboratories and offices in former Yugoslavia. Espionage also plays important role in searching for relevant information. Some of the anti-abortion, animal and anti-technology groups are prone to such an activity. Others just try to create the essence of anarchy. Cyberterrorism can also be used in conjunction with traditional methods of violence/war elements and this can amplify the effect. Counter Measures: - INFOCOM/THREATCON: DOD Response Programs. - Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (Homeland Security). Companies try to outsource less sensible stuff. (Comment on this)
Tuesday, November 2nd, 2004
11:10 pm	Terrorist Strategy: WMDs Terrorist Strategy: WMDs. • Nuclear Terrorism: o Definition of Nuclear Device; o RDD – “Dirty Bombs”; o Sabotage. • Advantage: o High Casualty; o Fear/Devastation. • Restraints/Limits: o Self-imposed Restraints; o Retaliation. • Proliferation: o Ineffective International Regime; o Break up of USSR; o Pakistan and Dr. Khan (old scientist who developed nuclear weapon’s program for Pakistan), DPRK, Iran. Overview: • Mass Destruction = Mass Terror: WMDs can result in mass kill and terror that creates panic and fear of unknown factor. • Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups and WMDs: WMDs are most likely to appeal to radical religious groups because of their psychology “Us versus Them”. WMDs --> Chemical Weapons: • History: WWI, Cold War, Iraq. WWI showed that militarily WMDs were not so useful (were used by Germany). Japan used them against Chinese civilians during WWII and by Nazis in prisoner camps. Nixon in 1969 decided that chemical weapons is not worth of its keeping and prepared special treaty on chemical weapons which USSR agreed to sign. Nevertheless, other countries are still developing WMDs even after collapse of USSR (DPRK, Iraq-Iran War and anti-Kurds genocide in 1990s; Iran has also launched its own WMDs program). Types: • Blood Agents (Hydrogen Cyanide). • Respiratory Agents (Chlorine). • Nerve Agents (Ricin, Sarin). The Case of Aum Shinrikyo: it was the first case of using WMDs by terrorist group. In March of 1995 they spreaded sarin gas in Tokyo’s metro. It was a group of Shoko Asahara which used mixture of Buddhism and some kind of cult as the ideology. Many of his followers were people looking for the real sense of life. Aum Shinrykio managed to establish offices abroad (Russia, ROK). They had very radical and eschatological views (“…the end of the world will start from Japan”) which helped them to decide to develop WMDs. Aum Shinrikyo is religious fundamental group that fits our pattern of potential users of WMDs. They used chemical weapons effectively in a closed space. Lessons: • Closed Space. • Easy Access: trained staff can find (on the black market) and mix necessary components together. • Small Group/Lone Wolves: Aum Shinrikyo was not known to mass audience before its attacks. This fact creates important threats: how many groups do operate and have an access to WMDs? Problems: • Difficulties in Mass Weaponzing. • Hadling Difficulties/Detection: first of all, you get sufficient amounts of WMDs, then, if you want to disperse it, say, by plane, you should be familiar with different kinds of techniques (you need to fly low). But much longer before you use it, you should establish laboratory where you could prepare (during the experiments there is a high probability of explosions). In addition, in big cities of US there are air-monitors which detect agents (60 – 70% efficient). (Comment on this)
11:10 pm	Terrorism and the Media Terrorism and the Media • Introduction: the Role of Television (there is enormous linkage between growth of TV and growth of terrorism). • Immediacy (you become a participant of terrorist act and whole range of the emotions); drama (TV tends to present facts while appealing to your emotions); story-line (they like to present a fact in a way that is very similar to film; by doing this they are simplifying things by presenting standard formulas in order to fit the time frames); global-reach (it is everywhere). Terrorist groups also use different types of attacks because of TV (more spectacular). What the Media Provides to Terrorists: • Getting the Message Out to Multiple Audiences: Supporters, Potential Sympathizers and Opponents. Terrorist group reinforces already convinced supporters by carrying out attacks. In addition, they encourage potential sympathizers to become a real/potential supporters (“…we are fighting effectively for you!”). In the beginning terrorist group presents itself (“…we are here!”) and makes opponents recognize it. • Indirect Pressure on Government: Affecting Public Opinion (Attack –> Fear/Terror –> Pressure to Change Policy). • State Interests in Limiting Media: o Deny propaganda opportunities; o Acquire information on strategy/protect security; o Limit impact on public opinion, i.e. decrease the number of potential supporters. Media Self-interest: • Corporate Profits vs. “The Fourth Estate”. • How to Report a Story? o Problems of access & Accuracy to Terrorist Group. o Balance: Should the Media be Objective? o Responsible Coverage vs. Self-Censorship. o Does the Media Provide Background? • Relations to US. • Plague on both your houses. • Stereotypical language. • Epithets and Rationality. Media companies have cut dramatically the amount of news that they deliver. Increased the number of news magazines. Even if you manage to get info from terrorist group how can you verify it, i.e. you can not rely on terrorist. In addition, you may be labeled a sort of sympathizer to terrorist group. Most of the info comes from government sources. Journalists live in the society and they are affected by it (by reflecting the values and cultural traditions). So, can they be objective. But they still need to keep the flag waiving and, therefore, preserve a balance. The polarization in the country affects the reasonability of Media’s behavior. Journalist should not provide info on something related to critiques of what is happening now. Journalists reflect the biases of their home country. To be objective does not necessarily mean to pay equal attention to opposite sides. They also like to use fanatical language that gives the impression of terrorists’ stupidity (that means you are not able to provide a background to terrorist group -> you can not deal with it). Journalists also use labels (for example, Reagan’s “Mad Dog Quaddafi”). Media also do not provide historical, cultural and traditional background. (Comment on this)
10:59 am	Terrorism and International Relations, State-Sponsored Terrorism Terrorism and International Relations, State-Sponsored Terrorism • Terror as an Aspect of Foreign Policy. One of the things that, say, CIA goes every day is running through different scenarios. Intelligence also often says things that government wants to hear. Groupthink is another problem (to think outside the scenarios). • The Link between States and Terror: states often use terrorism as a part of foreign policy in order to destabilize the opponent by keeping it occupied in some area (like did France while supporting IRA back to 1970s or like it happens in Kashmir which attracts much resources from India and, to some extent, makes Pakistan country which supports terrorism). State-sponsored terrorism, on the other hand, can lead to sanctions against a given state. • There are Three Links between State and Terrorism which can initially come out: o Provide a Safe Heaven: state can open the doors to a terrorist group but it also can keep given group on a short leash (like it was with Abu Nidal in Baghdad). Some states engage in terrorism directly without any third party (for example, DPRK used assassinations, kidnappings and plane bombing as a means of foreign policy). o Arms, Money and Training. o Direct Sponsorship The Cold War (1945-1989) and Role of USSR: (the SU was described by many westerners as a terrorist state) • Marxist-Leninist Theory and Practice: Marxism was always very skeptical about terrorism but Lenin was not so skeptical. • Support for Liberation Movements: bringing new government to power by supporting national-liberation movements. Soviets did not see such an activity as a support of terrorist groups. USSR has also been supporting PLO but it was a little bit skeptical about RAF or RB and supported them through surrogates, i.e. East Germany, Bulgaria, etc. • Lack of International Consensus: Soviets were very effective in preventing any sort of UN resolutions on terrorism (it was US which wanted to claim third world liberation movements as terrorism groups). • Purpose? Destabilization vs. Opportunism. • US-Sponsored Terrorism? US were engaged in terrorism related activity: bombing the harbors in Nicaragua by the hands of Contras (armed cells of opposition to government) but with CIA help. US attempted to assassinate Castro and supported Israel when it invaded Palestine and bulldozered houses(this fact was seen by many as support for terrorism). • Cuba is still considered as state sponsoring terrorism. It has traditionally provided safe heaven for FATH and other terrorist leaders. Another question is that FATH is largely organized as guerilla movement which, however, uses drug trafficking as a major source of money. On the other hand, FATH is engaged in international terrorism, i.e. it invites IRA experts which share information with them. • North Korea used international agencies, army and Special Forces to assassinate South Korea’s officials. But North Korea does not delegate completion of these tasks to any third party. • Sudan : Al-Qaeda (providing safe heaven). • Syria: Hizbollah/Hamas. Syria was not directly engaged in terrorism activity but provided safe heaven to different terrorist groups, it even tried to support PKK in Turkey, a traditional rival of Syria in the Middle East). Syria also had a big influence over Hezbollah based in Lebanon because of Syrian troops there. • Iran does more directly support Hezbollah (kidnapping US citizens in 1970s), Rushdie Fatwa. Iran demonstrates the complexity of using terrorism as a method of foreign policy. We can, to some extent, compare Iran to USSR. It interested in keeping US busy and occupied. Al-Ansur – almost Iranian front within northern parts of Iraq • Libya: PanAm103, Abu Nidal. Qaddafi is in power for almost 40 years. He managed to cam to power on the nationalistic, anti-western, feelings and started to fight against Israel by supporting Palestinian movements. In 1980s Reagan considered Libya as a major threat (US government even decided to place blocks on the streets of NY for the first time in the history). Through the Reagan administration tensions increased: US fighter planes shot down three Libyan planes when they crossed the NATO air boarders. As a reaction there was the explosion in Berlin discotheque which. Libyan intelligence was suspected and US successfully sanctioned bombings of Tripoli. Libya also bombed Scottish plane full of tourists. But in 1999 suspected agents were handed to Deutch government and, finally, were prosecuted in Holland under the Scottish Law. in turn, led to the bombings of Tripoli. In 1991 there was locker sin bombing in UK. In addition, Oqaddafi is also suspected in nuclear-weapons development. New uni-polar system makes him more vulnerable. On the other hand, he also sees some of is nationalistic ideas as being condemned by religious fundamentalists. • Saudi Arabia: Charities and Madrasas. There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has very strong links with terrorists. Many money come to Iraq from Saudi Arabia’s charities. It also sends fighters to Iraq. But US fear the weakening of Saudis monarchy. Saudis are Wahhabis, a kind of radical Sunny Islam, since 18th century. They were also funding Madrasas everywhere in the Middle East. In addition, the fact that most of 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, shows the relevance of assumptions mentioned above. • Afghanistan/Pakistan: Kashmir, financing. Summary of “Global Rebels: Terrorist Organizations as Transnational Actors” (by L. Richardson, 1998, p. 67-73) US Perceptions of Terrorism: US perceives international terrorism as deliberately directed by governments (USSR in 1970-1980s and Islamic terrorism following instructions of Middle Eastern capitals nowadays). Currently there are seven states on the list: Cuba, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Sudan and Syria. During the Cold War the bipolar structure of international system lent itself to the sponsorship of terrorist groups. It made the competition inevitable. But uni-polar system shows that its international distribution of power does not determine the use of terror. Us used a terrorism as a method of foreign policy by supporting for Chilean anti-Allende forces in 1970s, the Nicaraguan Contras in 1980s, or for anti-Castro forces. Five Degrees of Separation 1. Killing dissidents (US accuses Iran in doing so). 2. Recruiting and training of operatives/agents for overseas missions (example with Iranian intelligence that killed Kurdish dissidents in Berlin, 1992). But as far as selective assassinations of dissidents remain quite distinct from the random violence associated with terrorism, the murder of dissidents represents a strategy of illegal state repression rather than state-sponsored terrorism. 3. Close control of a terrorist group (usually by the help of intelligence). There are two examples of groups which are very dependent on their sponsors: Saiqa Palestinian Group and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP – GC). They receive directions and support from Syria and even have headquarters in Damascus. 4. Providing training, funds and safe heaven for an autonomous terrorist group (almost all Palestinian groups). Sponsoring states are usually blamed that they may not have had any prior-knowledge of atrocity. 5. Supporting foreign terrorist groups in order to help them fight against common enemy (like did Muammar Qaddafi in supporting IRA). Exporting Revolution: Iran is trying to export Islamic Revolution by supporting Shiite opposition in Gulf States rather than waging war against West. In the Middle East the terrorist groups tried to overthrow the secular leadership of their own governments (al-Gama at al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad in Egypt). (Comment on this)
9:38 am	Terrorism: Terrorist Organization • Size and Territory • Structure: some of the terrorist groups follow a classical pyramid structure. On the top – command, below – active cadre, below – active and passive supporters (passive supporters usually are just sympathizers but they can be pushed to become active supporters; passive supporters form the largest group and we should discourage them from becoming an active supporters while enforcing counter-terror measures). • Organizational Pyramid as Net War: recently many groups begun to wage a “net war”, i.e. they are not pyramid organized but have decentralized structure. They cooperate with each other through different networks around the world. They are independent from each other but are internationally “interneted”. Nevertheless, any given netwar node can still have pyramid structure. • Functional Organization: command, supply, intelligence, training, discipline (active cadre are usually divided according to these functions). • Cells and Columns: columns are smaller brigades (15 -20 persons) who have more or less military structure (usually guerillas have columns). The cells structure is enormously useful (4 – 8 pesrons): we can find the cells at the level of active supporters and they are isolated from each other while active cadre remain in shadow. Each such cell usually has a leader who handles the communication and finance. It is really hard to penetrate cells: they socialize and live together and even if you infiltrate them you will know nothing about other cells. The use of cells became very popular during the Algerian war (with France). Often the cells have little knowledge about what happen in 3 – 4 weeks. It is hard to find cell but it is even more difficult to find a “lone wolf”. • “Lone Wolves”: like Zarkawy in Iraq or T. Macwey. • Management issues (Secrecy) and Internal Discipline: because they have decentralized structure there is a high probability of that a given cell might go on its own. That is why terrorist groups are very disciplined. On the other hand, group can become a kind of paranoiac while paying to much attention to internal discipline (starting killing its own members), i.e. secrecy can also foster frustration among members. • Tactical Support: logistical support is necessary for providing transportation, feeding, housing, etc. Usually tactical support is provided by active supporters. But terrorists still can develop network of tactical support without relying on active supporters (Internet Cafés, Libraries, etc.). • Training: it is easy to find many enthusiastic supporters without sense of discipline, shooting skills, etc. It is hard to get them the training program and infiltrate. Tactical training is teaching of shooting. So, training process includes: teaching of how to use a given technique. • Indoctrination/Socialization. • Weed out: Training Camps, Use existent infrastructure (Al Qaeda members were enrolled in a flight schools in US before 9/11; guns clubs, etc.). To what level should intelligence services control the access to such kind of sensible courses. • Financing: State Support, Gansterism (extortion, bank robberies, Legitimate Businesses, Charities. State Support (till the mid-1980s this was rather popular method of getting money). The small states-sponsors of terrorism become open to some sort of retaliation. For example, Syria is “terrorist state, but Saudi Arabia is not (because of its oil), i.e. there is some selectiveness. Terrorist can also use illegal activities to get money: gangsterism, robberies, etc. For example, IRA and German Red Brigades were moving fast towards extortion, - in some way terrorist become an organized crime. But if terrorist group is engaged in such activity, it can undermine people’s support and, more importantly, internal discipline (when members start to enjoy the access to finance and spend it on personal needs). The drug activity is also a great way to buy arms and pay salaries (FARC, Taliban) but it leads to spending too much time on cultivating drugs. When people see it, their support to the group engaged in drug activity begins to decrease. But in general it is hard to limit such activities because of the lack of economic support to the villages where people see opium as the only source of income. We can also get money through legitimate business as it do Al-Qaeda’s construction companies, Middle East network of honey shops through which they easily transport arms. It is very hard to detect such illegal activity. Charity can also help to get money: where their money go is not always clear. It is great opportunity for the Hamas, NORAID and IRA, etc. Complicated banking rules, liberal banking laws of particular countries (Panama, Bahamas, Bahrain) and globalization on the other hand also help to support terrorist groups financially. (Comment on this)
Monday, November 1st, 2004
12:09 pm	Terrorism: Nationalism and Terrorism Defining Nationalism: - Motivation; - National Liberation Movements (trying to get independence); - Decline till the Cold War; - 1990s – Motivating Factor of Modern Terrorist Groups (Tamil Tigers, PKK, ETA, PIRA). National Identity: Backlash against Globalization (“We are not the same, we are better than you”). Nationalism and Religion: religion can be part of nationalism (as in Chechnya in the beginning of 1990s; but terrorist there were more nationalistic) Emphasis on National Identity: - Historical Context, Human Creation (as a result of certain historical process). Strategy: encourage crackdowns (to provoke government’s crackdown and unite people against it). PIRA: - Importance of History: Memory and Commemorations; - Overlapping Motives: Religion, Ideology and Nationalism; - Self-view as “defensive” (against UK colonialism); - 1978-1985: Hunger Strikes, Thatcher Crackdown, Urban Offensives and Declining Support; - 1988 – Peace Negotiations: US as Mediator; Easter Agreement: Problems in Trust. ETA: - Limited Political Support and Money; - Ceding of Autonomy and Extreme Violence Alienate Potential Supporters PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization: by some measures PLO is the most successful terrorist group ever. For much of its history it could have raise hundreds of millions of US$. In addition, it PLO has political luck, international recognition (Palestinians had been given an observer status in UN, armaments. - Development: Six-Day War; Black September; 1972 Munich Olympics (PFLP); Lebanese Civil Intifadah I & II; Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade & Suicide. - Success? Money: Int’l Recognition; Political Support; Armaments; Thousands of Fighters; Support for a Palestinian State. After the Black September Palestinians were engaged actively in terrorist activity because they did not have the opportunity to wage a guerilla war in Jordan and Egypt. (Comment on this)
Thursday, October 28th, 2004
9:22 pm	Some Historical Roots of Divide between the North and South. Impact of Globalization. In this paper I will discuss the factors and characteristics that can create barriers in the way of third world states’ development. I will compare to this situation in developed countries. As far as globalization plays a big role in the global divide, we will not only go through some negative aspects of globalization but also highlight some historical data that could help us to understand the roots of differences between the North and the South. Before going into specifics I would like to highlight some important historical moments in order to better understand the genesis of increasing difference in the existence of rich North and poor South countries. First of all, reviewing the origins of the divide, the industrial revolution played a great role. At the time Europeans and North Americans began to move away from agriculture to more effective economic activities. In the “The Great Divide in the Global Village” Scott asserts: “Opportunities for growth in the world markets have shifted from raw or semiprocessed commodities toward manufactured goods and services – and, within these categories, toward more knowledge intensive segments. This trend obviously favors rich countries over poor ones, since most of the latter are still peripheral players in the knowledge economy. 1” The fact that agricultural societies are left behind is usually explained by one of two theories. The first, modernization theory, points out that countries that wish to become as rich as developed countries of the global North must become like them by adopting their institutions, economic policies and system of values which support such institutions and policies2 . The other, dependency theory, attributes the poverty of South to the egoistic or, in other words, realpolitik actions of North, i.e. the rich countries benefit from cheap labor and minerals of Southern countries by keeping them poor. According to dependency theorists, the problems of underdevelopment were not internal to poor countries but were largely determined by external factors and the way former colonies were integrated into the world economy: “What kept Third World countries underdeveloped were social and economic factors, namely the dominated position that those countries had in the global order. Underdevelopment was the flip side and the consequence of the development of the Western World3 ” However, as David Landes points out, there are several exceptions to these theories; for example: Ireland, Finland, Taiwan, Republic of Korea as well as increasing influence of China, India and some Latin American states. All of them were poor pre-industrial colonies and were forced to operate under the system structured by rich countries but they have not met the same fate as other less developed countries. There are also cultural differences between North and South countries. History shows that possibility of migration has allowed groups to avoid conflict and, as a result, they lacked the ability to compromise4 . We can also point out many other factors, both socio-political and economic, which help to increase the difference. These are: chronic instability, central role of a state in economic affairs (over-centralization of power often leads to corruption and inefficiency). Previous colonization and, later, authoritarian regimes of new states also affected the countries standing in international arena. It led to a high mortality rate and to the maintenance of the previous system of exploitation for the advantage of a small domestic elite5. According to David Landes, the following factors contributed greatly to the North’s success: building of “know-how” unchecked by conservative opposition, autonomy of intellectual inquiry and routinization of research and its diffusion. He also says that “many countries tend to place unnecessarily narrow restrictions on the use of their own human resources”6 . As we can see, the lack of following such factors still continues to hold back development in many Southern countries. In addition, the way gender relations are traditionally structured often does not stimulate the development of a given state. In many parts of the global South, governments do not pay much attention to this issue and, therefore, the denial of opportunities for women deprives a country of labor and talent7 . With all these factors working against the South globalization has increased economic inequality in several ways: - it has increased instability and volatility in labor markets; - it has weakened the forces of compromise between mobile capital and immobile communities and labor; - technologically driven transfers of, mostly Northern states, have led to a backlash against the globalization process in the areas where such ideas and culture are most alien. Globalization has also made it more difficult to maintain high labor standards. According to Rodrik in the past there were three main methods of covering the increased costs of higher labor standards: devaluation of currency in terms of foreign currency to offset the loss due to competitiveness, rising of taxes to finance the higher standards and workers could experience a downward adjustment in their wages to make up the increased costs8 . In this light, globalization, mobile capital, and business can leave a country in a situation of unfavorable fiscal or tax policies. This, in turn, can leave the workers themselves to bear the burden of increased labor standards. The weakening of forces of compromise is another problem of globalization. Rodrik states that globalization reduces the readiness of international corporations to cooperate with others in solving problems, i.e. it is easy for international business to move away from problematic region. In addition, it is hard to keep such internationally mobile groups accountable when they violate local laws and norms. This leads to the situation when Southern countries are forced to bear the costs of improvements in their own societies without benefit of input from affected groups9 . All the factors mentioned above (the lack of compromise and cooperation, unemployment, increasing costs being forced upon those least able to bear it and the promotion of foreign values) and many others (which are too many to mention in only one essay) in turn, lead to backlashes against globalization which are more destructive in South. As a result we have both instability and unpredictability (politically, economically and socially) in developing countries10 . According to Rosenberg, globalization has also increased the divide between rich Northern and poor Southern countries. She states: “…the number of people who live on less than $1 a day is slightly down, but the number of people who live on less than $2 a day is slightly up. Inequality has soared during the last 15 years, but economists cannot agree on whether globalization is mainly at fault or whether other forces, like the uneven spread of technology, are responsible”11 . Countries in the South become further destabilized which leads to social conflict, high rates of unemployment and, indirectly, diseases. Developing countries can also have higher degrees of volatility which creates an uncertain business climate. So, from my point of view, it is clear that globalization is having an effect on the South and helps to increase the divide between North and South. However, it should be noted that some countries have managed to cross the line of division. I think that the appropriate solution to the South’s problems lie within. But I can hardly imagine that if globalization were to disappear tomorrow the divide between North and South would too. 1. “The Great Divide in the Global Village”, Bruce R. Scott, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2001. 2. From my point of view, nowadays following modernization theory means following the “Americanization theory”, i.e. becoming another US colony in post-colonial era and, therefore, not following your own way. 3. “Family Tree of Theories, Methodologies and Strategies in Development communication: Convergences and Differences”, Prepared for Rockefeller Foundation, Silvio Waisbord, 2001. 4. In my opinion the history of isolationalist Korea of XIX Century serves as a good example of this thought. I would recommend to read Bruce Cumings’ “Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History” for better understanding of the unwillingness of some states to cooperate with others. 5. “The Great Divide in the Global Village”, Bruce R. Scott, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2001. 6. “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations”, David Landes, 1998. 7. The example of modern Republic of Korea I consider to be, to some extent, exceptional example: on the one hand, it has, largely, successfully adopted Western democracy but on the other, it is still enjoying following traditionally based system, including thinking of a women as of person who should serve men. 8. “Has globalization gone too far?”, Dani Rodrik, Washington, D.C. : Institute for International Economics, 1997. 9. “Has globalization gone too far?”, Dani Rodrik, Washington, D.C. : Institute for International Economics, 1997. 10. Konstantin Asmolov, the Senior Research Employee at Institute of Far Eastern Studies of Russian Academy of Science, has his own view regarding instability of a particular region. According to his point of view, the colonialism did not disappear. Nowadays it is not necessary to control a particular territory by deploying your troops there: it is enough if a state X manages control a state Y by means of capital or humanitarian aid. In addition, he states that many rich North countries still benefit from conflicts on the periphery even in the post-Cold War era and with increasing power of US hegemony this trend would still exist in the nearest future. 11. “The Free-Trade Fix”, Tina Rosenberg, The New York Times, August 18, 2002. (1 Comment |Comment on this)
Friday, October 15th, 2004
3:44 pm	Terrorism: “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)” “Anyone who would use innocents for political aims is not worthy of existence” US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage The terrorist threat to civilized world is becoming more and more important issue nowadays: today’s terrorists kill not only government officials or army representatives but also, I must admit, largely, achieve their political objectives by killing completely innocent people including children. To this end, among many modern terrorist groups I consider “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)” or, as we can translate it, “Requirements for getting into Paradise” which claimed responsibility for the series of recent terrorist attacks in Russian Federation to be rather dangerous terrorist group not only for Russia itself but also for its allies in the war against global terrorism1. This paper contains analysis of why can we count a particular group as terrorist group, some historical data, strategies and methods of acting as well as its goals and objectives which can help us to understand the real or potential threat to USA. Before going to the specifics I would like to provide you with some general data on a chosen group. The “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs” along with two other Chechen separatist groups were officially defined as terrorist organizations according to Executive Order 13224 by US Secretary of State Colin Powell on February 28, 2003 2. According to the FBI’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 2004, RSRSBCM is relatively young terrorist group which “was not known to Western observers before the seizure” of Dubrovka theatre in Moscow on October 23, 2002. While the “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs” does not have a long history of carrying out many terrorist attacks that can mainly be due to the fact that it was unknown previously or, in other words, was operating under other names long before the October 2002 hostage taking in Moscow. The leader of the group, Shamil Basayev, claimed for invasion to Dagestan in August 1999, bombing the pro-Russian Administration in Grozny, the capital city of Chechen Republic, on December 27, 2002, raid to Ingushetia during the last summer and two plane bombings in the end of August, 2004 as well as Beslan school tragedy in the early September, 2004.3 According to the Center for Defense Information Shamil Basayev is hiding in the mountainous parts of Southern Chechnya and his group consists of up to several hundreds of members. The complete and unconditional independence of Chechnya and spread of radical or fundamentalist Islamic Jihad in the region serve as the main goals of this group. After having completed the initial analysis of the operative information we may move on to the discussion about why we can consider “RSRSBCM” as terrorist group. As we know, the terrorism is not just the unthinking violence. Usually we can find a strategy behind the terrorist actions. The “RSRSBCM” is not the exception: it is really very hard to think that operations such as Dubrovka theatre or Beslan school’s hostage taking spontaneously occurred especially if you do not have enough both physical and psychological specific training skills. That means they had spent a lot of time preparing for their purposive and systematic operations. The group’s methods of acting also reflect the basic terrorist tactics: bombing, hijacking, arson, assault, kidnapping, and taking hostages4 . First, they used bombings and arson on August 25, 2004 when the so-called shahids, suicide bombers of “RSRSBCM”, blew up two planes within ten seconds killing all 88 people aboard. They also exploded two car bombs near Ryzhskaya metro station in Moscow on August 31, 2004, killing at least 8 people and wounding 18. Second, they use assassination as the way of pushing their agendas. On May 9, 2004, the pro-Russian President of Chechnya was killed during a parade but a time. Before this incident the leader of “RSRSBCM”, Shamil Basayev, offered $100000 for his head5. Third, terrorist often like to use direct armed assault which sometimes can be very effective. For example, on June 22, 2004, Basayev headed fighters invaded the Ingushetia and seized a police office, then taking out a truck full of explosives which was standing in the yard6 . Fourth, and as I think the most painful method which can influence the bigger audience, is the method of hostage taking. We can refer to the tragic example of Beslan where the activists of “RSRSBCM”, partly consisting of specially trained women suicide bombers, seized the school full of children and their parents on September 1, 2004.7 Fifth, Basayev also was engaged in terrorist activity against Russian army and civilians since 1991 when he hijacked the plane with 26 passengers on board 8. In addition, Basayev has been repeatedly warning Russian government by threatening to use weapons of mass destruction, thereby, giving the illusion that his group can fight on another, more powerful, level and displacing the responsibility for the future terrorist attacks on the Russian President “because he refuses to observe international law in the occupied territory of Ichkeria 9” . He also effectively manipulates the facts and runs the informational war against the Kremlin by the help of pro-terrorist web-sites such as www.kavkazcenter.com. On the other hand, Basayev uses international support as an additional force multiplier. According to the Center for Defense Information, he and his supporters had been to Afghanistan training camps which were created by Taliban movement in 1990s. Through Afghanis Taliban movement Basayev’s group could also have received volunteers to wage a holy war jihad against Moscow rule. Basayev also has ties with Osama bin Laden who can support him economically and desires to create so called “Caliphate”, a self centralized Muslim state under the Islam fundamentalist rule. As we know many religious fundamentalists use different techniques for justifying acts of violence. One of such technique is based on charismatic authoritarian leadership, i.e. the leaders of terrorist groups in some ways see and compare themselves with prophets or other legendary persons. To this end, there is a connection between the name of Shamil Basayev and the name of the Chechen resistance leader, Shamil, which has been fighting Russia for many years in 19th century. We can also consider so called demonization, which is actively used by different religious terrorist groups around the world, as one of the justifying techniques. Basayev is not exception in this case. Recently, while explaining his attitude to the Russian policy in Chechnya, he accused the “Kremlin vampire” in killing children in the town of Beslan 10 . Basing on the information mentioned above, I would like to highlight the most important points once again. The “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs” with its leader Shamil Basayev can be considered as terrorist organization because of the following moments: - Long and well planned violence operations based on strategic thinking in order to achieve political objectives which include independence of Chechnya, withdrawing Russian troops from its territory and, in perspective, establishing of Caliphate, a one Muslim nation state in North-Caucasus. - Use of largely known terrorist tactics such as bombings, hijacking, taking hostages, armed assault and arson. - Striving to influence wider audience by actively using modern communication systems, including mass media, in order to threat people and, in some sense, establish a 5th column inside Russian society. - Use or willing to use the major force multipliers such as support of foreign capital, threatening to use weapons of mass destruction. - Justifying its acts of violence in religious context, including reference to legendary persons and such methods as demonization of the enemy, especially when preparing suicide-bombers (shahids). Now, after viewing the Basayev’s group as terrorist organization, let’s understand how can the “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs” threaten US interests. First of all, the use of weapons of mass destruction, as mentioned above, is not just words, especially if we take into account the inability of Russian government to provide total security of places that hold nuclear-weapons. If the terrorist manage to get those weapons, say on the black market, they will be able not only threat any given country but create a very dangerous threat to the world community as whole. The attitude of Louise I. Shelley, Professor and Director of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, to this issue can prove the opinion: “terrorists who would plant a bombs in a children’s school are also capable of employing nuclear weapons. As the school assault has shown, there are no limits to the terrorist’s savagery. Therefore, Russia’s terrorist is a problem for the West as well. It is imperative that we work more closely with our Russian colleagues to speed and enhance the security at all sites containing weapons of mass destruction” Furthermore, according to Joe Barnes, a Baker Institute Research Employee, US have some concerns about the Caspian Basin’s use in transit of illicit drugs or transfer of controlled technologies which can be linked with the Chechen terrorist groups, including the “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs”. Second but not the least important thing is the issue of political and economic situation in Caucasus which can become more unstable if terrorists will continue their attacks: “The Caucasus, particularly mountain areas that straddle the North and South, are a potential Afghanistan, with all its consequences for us [USA]” 11 . In particular, instability in Caucasus can influence the US Caspian sea oil contracts and, in certain circumstances. Third, many of the Chechen gangs and, probably, members of the “Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs” recently begun to search for possible ways of leaving the Russia as law-enforcement agencies became more active after series of terrorist acts in August-September 2004. According to Northern Caucasus Counter-Terror Headquarters (ROSh), they are going to settle in some Western European Countries as refugees following the orders of foreign organizations like Muslim Brotherhood or Al-Qaeda. Such terrorist migration can lead to possible repeat of large-scale terror attacks in Europe as it was in Madrid and, in turn, can force US allies in Iraqi Campaign, say Poland, to withdraw its troops from Iraq. Fourth, in light of unstable situation in Iraq, including often fights between US troops and so called Mahdi Army, there is a high probability of that Basayev through his connections in Islam fundamentalist world would send fighters to resist Americans. This thought can be proved by Basayev’s ability to cooperate with foreign radical and terrorist groups as it was when he successfully trained his followers in Taliban’s camps, Afghanistan. After all, if Basayev continues to follow the tactics of taking hostages there is a big probability that we will be able to find US citizens among them as it was during the siege of the Dubrovka theatre when, according to the US Department of State’ Eurasia overview 2002, one US citizen and one US Legal Permanent Resident died. Sources: 1. “Basayev Claims Responsibility for Terror”, Kommersant News, September 17, 2004 (http://www.kommersant.com). 2. “Executive Order13224”, US Department of Treasury, September 9, 2004. 3. “Basaev Directed the Seizure by”, September 7, 2004, “War in the Caucasus”, June 23, 2004 (www.kommersant.com). 4. “Terrorism 2002 Update”, Jonathan R. White, 2002. 5. “Sentence Executed//A Political Assassination”. Kommersant News, May 14, 2004 (http://www.kommersant.com) 6. Some experts argue weather the terrorists were using captured explosives while bombing planes or not. 7. “Hostages Make Contact”, Kommersant News, September 2, 2004 (http://www.kommersant.com) 8. “The Chechen’s Story: From Unrivaled Guerilla Leader to the Terror of Russia”, New York Times, September 15, 2004. 9. “Chechen warlord threatens new attacks”, The Russian Journal, March 30, 2004. 10. “Basayev Claims Responsibility for Terror”, Kommersant News, September 17, 2004 11. Prepared Statement of Charles H. Fairbanks, Ph.D., Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, October 10, 2001. (1 Comment |Comment on this)
Saturday, October 2nd, 2004
6:45 pm	Chapter XIV Summary: Postscript: IR in A.D.... • Economic development in the third world has been uneven; per capita GDP increased in the 1970s but, except in Asia, decreased in the 1980s. Growth in the 1990s was brisk in Asia but slow elsewhere. • Evidence does not support a strong association of economic growth either with internal equality of wealth distribution or with internal inequality. • The newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—show that it is possible to rise out of poverty into sustained economic accumulation. Other third world states are trying to emulate these successes, but it is unclear whether these experiences can apply elsewhere. • China has registered strong economic growth in the past 15 years of market-oriented economic reforms. Though still quite poor, China may be emerging as a leading success story in third world economic development. • Economic development in other large third world countries such as India, Brazil, and Nigeria has been slowed by the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, by corruption, and by debt. • Import substitution has been largely rejected as a development strategy in favor of export-led growth. This reflects both the experiences of the NICs and the theory of comparative advantage. • Most poor states want to develop a manufacturing base, but this is a difficult thing to do. Even when focused on low-capital industries, states have generally had to sharpen income disparities in the process of concentrating capital for manufacturing. • The theory that democratization would accompany and strengthen economic development has not been supported by the actual experiences of third world countries. But the opposite theory—that authoritarian government is necessary to maintain control while concentrating capital for industrialization—has also not been supported. • Government corruption is a major obstacle to development throughout the third world. • Given the shortage of local capital in most poor states, foreign investment by MNCs is often courted as a means of stimulating economic growth. MNCs look for favorable local conditions, including political and economic stability, in deciding where to invest. • States in the global South seek the transfer of technology to support their future economic development. Technology transfer can be appropriate or inappropriate to local needs depending on the circumstances of each case. • The green revolution of the 1960s was a massive North-South transfer of agricultural technology, which had both good and bad effects. Today’s "green" technologies being transferred to the third world are techniques for environmentally sustainable development. • Third world debt, resulting largely from overborrowing in the 1970s and early 1980s, is a major problem. Through renegotiations and other debt management efforts, the North and South have improved the debt situation in recent years. However, the South remains almost $2 trillion in debt to the North, and annual debt service consumes about one-sixth of all hard-currency earnings from exports of the South (much more in some regions and states). • The IMF makes loans to states in the South conditional on economic and governmental reforms. These conditionality agreements often necessitate politically unpopular measures such as cutting food subsidies. • The WTO trading regime works against the third world by allowing richer nations to protect sectors in which the third world has advantages—notably agriculture and textiles. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) tries to compensate by lowering barriers to third world exports. • Efforts to improve the South’s solidarity, cooperation, and bargaining position relative to the North—such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO)—have had little success. • Foreign assistance, most of it from governments in the North, plays an important part in the economic development plans of the poorer states of the South. • Only a few states in the North meet the goal of contributing 0.7 percent of their GNPs as foreign assistance to the South. The United States, at 0.1 percent of its GNP, contributes the smallest share of any industrialized state, and its contributions have decreased by nearly half in recent years. • Most foreign aid consists of bilateral grants and loans from governments in the North to specific governments in the South. Such aid is often used for political leverage, and promotes the export of products from the donor state. • About one-fifth of foreign aid is not bilateral but is funneled through multilateral agencies—mostly UN programs. • Disaster relief provides short-term aid to prevent a natural disaster from reversing a poor state’s economic development efforts. Disaster relief generally involves cooperation by various donor governments, local governments, the UN, and private agencies. • Handouts to poor communities to meet immediate needs for food and supplies outside times of disaster—here called the missionary model—can be helpful but also have several drawbacks. Such aid can be inappropriate to local needs and can encourage dependence. • Efforts to support local organizations working to empower poor people and generate community economic development—here called the Oxfam model—are promising but have been tried only on a small scale. (4 Comments |Comment on this)
6:44 pm	Chapter XIII Summary: International Development • Economic development in the third world has been uneven; per capita GDP increased in the 1970s but, except in Asia, decreased in the 1980s. Growth in the 1990s was brisk in Asia but slow elsewhere, with parts of Africa sliding backwards. The 2001 recession created further obstacles for development. • Evidence does not support a strong association of economic growth either with internal equality of wealth distribution or with internal inequality. • The newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—show that it is possible to rise out of poverty into sustained economic accumulation. Other third world states are trying to emulate these successes, but it is unclear whether these experiences can apply elsewhere. • China has registered strong economic growth in the past 25 years of market-oriented economic reforms. Though still poor, China is the leading success story in third world economic development. • Economic development in other large third world countries such as India, Brazil, and Nigeria has been slowed by the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, by corruption, and by debt. • Import substitution has been largely rejected as a development strategy in favor of export-led growth. This reflects both the experiences of the NICs and the theory of comparative advantage. • Most poor states want to develop a manufacturing base, but this is a difficult thing to do. Even when focused on low-capital industries, states have generally had to sharpen income disparities in the process of concentrating capital for manufacturing. • The theory that democratization would accompany and strengthen economic development has not been supported by the actual experiences of third world countries. But the opposite theory—that authoritarian government is necessary to maintain control while concentrating capital for industrialization—has also not been supported. • Government corruption is a major obstacle to development throughout the third world. • Given the shortage of local capital in most poor states, foreign investment by MNCs is often courted as a means of stimulating economic growth. MNCs look for favorable local conditions, including political and economic stability, in deciding where to invest. • States in the global South seek the transfer of technology to support their future economic development. Technology transfer can be appropriate or inappropriate to local needs depending on the circumstances of each case. • The green revolution of the 1960s was a massive North-South transfer of agricultural technology, which had both good and bad effects. Today’s “green” technologies being transferred to the third world are techniques for environmentally sustainable development. • Third world debt, resulting largely from overborrowing in the 1970s and early 1980s, is a major problem. Through renegotiations and other debt management efforts, the North and South have improved the debt situation in recent years. However, the South remains almost $2 trillion in debt to the North, and annual debt service consumes about one-sixth of all hard-currency earnings from exports of the South (much more in some regions and states). • The IMF makes loans to states in the South conditional on economic and governmental reforms. These conditionality agreements often necessitate politically unpopular measures such as cutting food subsidies. • The WTO trading regime works against the third world by allowing richer nations to protect sectors in which the third world has advantages—notably agriculture and textiles. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) tries to compensate by lowering barriers to third world exports. • Efforts to improve the South’s solidarity, cooperation, and bargaining position relative to the North—such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO)—have had little success. • Foreign assistance, most of it from governments in the North, plays an important part in the economic development plans of the poorer states of the South. • Only a few states in the North meet the goal of contributing 0.7 percent of their GNPs as foreign assistance to the South. The United States, at 0.1 percent of its GNP, contributes the smallest share of any industrialized state, and its contributions decreased sharply in the past decade. • Most foreign aid consists of bilateral grants and loans from governments in the North to specific governments in the South. Such aid is often used for political leverage, and promotes the export of products from the donor state. • About one-fifth of foreign aid is not bilateral but is funneled through multilateral agencies—mostly UN programs. • Disaster relief provides short-term aid to prevent a natural disaster from reversing a poor state’s economic development efforts. Disaster relief generally involves cooperation by various donor governments, local governments, the UN, and private agencies. • Handouts to poor communities to meet immediate needs for food and supplies outside times of disaster—here called the missionary model—can be helpful but also have several drawbacks. Such aid can be inappropriate to local needs and can encourage dependence. • Efforts to support local organizations working to empower poor people and generate community economic development—here called the Oxfam model—are promising but have been tried only on a small scale. (Comment on this)
6:44 pm	Chapter XII Summary: The North-South Gap • Most of the world’s people live in poverty in the third world. About a billion live in extreme poverty, without access to adequate food, water, and other necessities. • Moving from poverty to well-being requires the accumulation of capital. Capitalism and socialism take different views on this process. Capitalism emphasizes overall growth with considerable concentration of wealth, whereas socialism emphasizes a fair distribution of wealth. • Most states have a mixed economy with some degree of private ownership of capital and some degree of state ownership. However, state ownership has not been very successful in accumulating wealth. Consequently, many states are selling off state-owned enterprises (privatization), especially in Russia and Eastern Europe. • Marxists view international relations, including global North-South relations, in terms of a struggle between economic classes (especially workers and owners) that have different roles in society and different access to power. • Since Lenin’s time, many Marxists have attributed poverty in the South to the concentration of wealth in the North. In this theory, capitalists in the North exploit the South economically and use the wealth thus generated to buy off workers in the North. Revolutions thus occur in the South and are ultimately directed against the North. • IR scholars in the world-system school argue that the North is a core region specializing in producing manufactured goods and the South is a periphery specializing in extracting raw materials through agriculture and mining. Between these are semiperiphery states with light manufacturing. • Today’s North-South gap traces its roots to the colonization of the third world regions by Europe over the past several centuries. This colonization occurred at different times in different parts of the world, as did decolonization. • Because of the negative impact of colonialism on local populations, anticolonial movements arose throughout the third world at various times and using various methods. These culminated in a wave of successful independence movements after World War II in Asia and Africa. (Latin American states gained independence much earlier.) • Following independence, third world states were left with legacies of colonialism, including their basic economic infrastructures, that made wealth accumulation difficult in certain ways. These problems still remain in many countries. • Wealth accumulation (including the demographic transition discussed in Chapter 11) depends on the meeting of basic human needs such as access to food, water, education, shelter, and health care. Third world states have had mixed success in meeting their populations’ basic needs. • War has been a major impediment to meeting basic needs, and to wealth accumulation generally, in poor countries. Almost all the wars of the past 50 years have been fought in the third world. • Hunger and malnutrition are rampant in the third world. The most important cause is the displacement of subsistence farmers from their land because of war, population pressures, and the conversion of agricultural land into plantations growing export crops to earn hard currency. • Urbanization is increasing throughout the third world as more people move from the countryside to cities. Huge slums have grown in the cities as poor people arrive and cannot find jobs. • Women’s central role in the process of accumulation has begun to be recognized. International agencies based in the North have started taking women’s contributions into account in analyzing economic development in the South. • Poverty in the South has led huge numbers of migrants to seek a better life in the North; this has created international political frictions. War and repression in the South have generated millions of refugees seeking safe haven. Under international law and norms, states are generally supposed to accept refugees but do not have to accept migrants. • Many people throughout the third world have turned to political revolution as a strategy for changing economic inequality and poverty. Often, especially during the Cold War, states in the North were drawn into supporting one side or the other during such revolutions. • Today the most potent third world revolutions are the Islamic revolutions in the Middle East. Even more than the communist revolutions of the past, Islamic revolutions are directed against the North and reject the Western values on which the international system is based. Like communist ones, Islamic revolutions draw support and legitimacy from the plight of poor people. • When revolutionaries succeed in taking power, they usually change their state’s foreign policy. Over time, however, old national interests and strategies tend to reappear. After several decades in power, revolutionaries usually become conservative and in particular come to support the norms and rules of the international system (which are favorable to them as state leaders). • North-South relations, although rooted in a basic economic reality—the huge gap in accumulated wealth—reflect the close connections of economics with international security. (Comment on this)
6:44 pm	Chapter XI Summary: The Environment • Environmental problems are an example of international interdependence and often create collective goods problems for the states involved. The large numbers of actors involved in global environmental problems make them more difficult to solve. • To resolve such collective goods problems, states have used international regimes and IOs, and have in some cases extended state sovereignty (notably over territorial waters) to make management a national rather than an international matter. • International efforts to solve environmental problems aim to bring about sustainable economic development. This was the theme of the 1992 UN Earth Summit. • Global warming results from burning fossil fuels—the basis of industrial economies today. The industrialized states are much more responsible for the problem than are third world states. Solutions are difficult to reach because costs are substantial and dangers are somewhat distant and uncertain. • Damage to the earth’s ozone layer results from the use of specific chemicals, which are now being phased out under international agreements. Unlike global warming, the costs of solutions are much lower and the problem is better understood. • Many species are threatened with extinction due to loss of habitats such as rain forests. An international treaty on biodiversity and an agreement on forests aim to reduce the destruction of local ecosystems, with costs spread among states. • The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes an ocean regime that puts most commercial fisheries and offshore oil under control of states as territorial waters. The United States signed the treaty after a decade’s delay. • Pollution—including acid rain, water and air pollution, and toxic and nuclear waste—tends to be more localized than global and has been addressed mainly through unilateral, bilateral, and regional measures rather than global ones. • The economies of the industrialized West depend on fossil fuels. Overall, these economies import energy resources, mostly oil, whereas the other world regions export them. Oil prices rose dramatically in the 1970s but declined in the 1980s as the world economy adjusted by increasing supply and reducing demand. After spiking around 1991 and again around 2000, prices dropped again. Such fluctuations undermine world economic stability. • The most important source of oil traded worldwide is the Persian Gulf area of the Middle East. Consequently, this area has long been a focal point of international political conflict, including the 1991 Gulf War. • States need other raw materials such as minerals, but no such materials have assumed the importance or political status of oil. Water resources are a growing source of local international conflicts, however. • War and other military activities cause considerable environmental damage—some times deliberately inflicted as part of a war strategy. • World population—now at 6.2 billion—will reach 7 to 8 billion within 25 years and may eventually level out around 9 to 10 billion. Virtually all of the increase will come in the global South. • Future world population growth will be largely driven by the demographic transition. Death rates have fallen throughout the world, but birthrates will fall proportionally only as per capita incomes go up. The faster the economies of poor states develop, the sooner their populations will level out. • The demographic transition sharpens disparities of wealth globally and locally. High per capita incomes and low population growth make rich states or groups richer, whereas low incomes and high population growth reinforce each other to keep poor states and groups poor. • Within the overall shape of the demographic transition, government policies can reduce birthrates somewhat at a given level of per capita income. Effective policies are those that improve access to birth control and raise the status of women in society. Actual policies vary, from China’s very strict rules on childbearing to pronatalist governments that encourage maximum birthrates and outlaw birth control. • Death rates are stable and little affected in the large picture by wars, famines, and other disasters. Raising the death rate is not a feasible way to limit population growth. • Although the global AIDS epidemic may not greatly slow world population growth, it will impose huge costs on many poor states in the coming years. Currently 40 million people are infected with HIV, and 30 million more have died. Most are in Africa, and new infections are growing rapidly in Asia and Russia. • AIDS demonstrates that growing international interdependence—the shrinking world—has costs and not just benefits. Because states cannot wall themselves off from the outside world, international cooperation in addition to unilateral state actions will be necessary to contain AIDS. • Population pressures do not cause, but do contribute to, a variety of international conflicts including ethnic conflicts, economic competition, and territorial disputes. (Comment on this)
6:43 pm	Chapter X Summary: Integration • Supranational processes bring states together in larger structures and identities. These processes generally lead to an ongoing struggle between nationalism and supranationalism. • International integration—the partial shifting of sovereignty from the state toward supranational institutions—is considered an outgrowth of international cooperation in functional (technical and economic) issue areas. • Integration theorists thought that functional cooperation would spill over into political integration in foreign policy and military issue areas. This has not occurred. Indeed, powerful forces of disintegration are tearing apart previously existing states in some regions (especially in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). • The European Union (EU) is the most advanced case of integration. Its 25 member states have given considerable power to the EU in economic decision making and 12 have adopted a common currency, the euro. However, national power still outweighs supranational power even in the EU. • Since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, the mission and membership of what is now the EU have expanded continually. • The most important and most successful element in the EU is its customs union (and the associated free-trade area). Goods can cross borders of member states freely, and the members adopt unified tariffs with regard to goods entering from outside the EU. • The EU has a new monetary union with a single European currency (the euro) in 12 of the 25 EU states. It is the biggest experiment with money in history. Such a union will require roughly comparable inflation rates and financial stability in participating states. • The EU has a new monetary union with a single European currency (the euro) in 12 of the 15 EU states. It is the biggest experiment with money in history. Such a union will require roughly comparable inflation rates and financial stability in participating states. • In structure, the EU revolves around the permanent staff of “Eurocrats” under the European Commission. The Commission’s president, individual members, and staff all serve Europe as a whole—a supranational role. However, the Council of Ministers representing member states (in national roles) has power over the Commission. • The European Parliament has members directly elected by citizens in EU states, but it has few powers and cannot legislate the rules for the community. The European Court of Justice also has limited powers, but has extended its jurisdiction more successfully than any other international court, and can overrule national laws. • The Single European Act, or "Europe 1992," created a common market throughout the EU, with uniform standards, open borders, and freedom of goods, services, labor, and capital within the EU. • The 1991 Maastricht Treaty on closer European integration (monetary union and political-military coordination) provoked a public backlash in several countries. Some citizens began to resent the power of EU bureaucrats over national culture and daily life. The treaty was ratified despite these difficulties, however. • The EU took in three new members in 1995—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—but Norwegians voted not to join. Ten new members, mostly Eastern European, joined the EU in 2004. The EU’s structures and procedures are being adapted as it moves from 15 to 25 members. The EU faces challenges in deciding how far to expand its membership. To some extent, the broadening of membership conflicts with the deepening of ties among the existing members. • In addition to the EU and the associated European Free Trade Association (EFTA), there are a variety of overlapping groupings, formal and informal, that reflect the process of integration in Europe. • A different type of international integration can be seen in the growing role of communication and information operating across national borders. Supranational relationships and identities are being fostered by new information technologies— especially mass media such as TV, radio, and the Internet—although such a process is still in an early stage. • Greater access to information increases government power both domestically and internationally. Governments also use the dissemination of information across borders as a means of influencing other states. Thus information technologies can serve national and not just supranational purposes. • Government access to information increases the stability of international relationships. The security dilemma and other collective goods problems are made less difficult in a transparent world where governments have information about each others’ actions. • The greater and freer flow of information around the world can undermine the authority and power of governments as well. It is now extremely difficult for authoritarian governments to limit the flow of information in and out of their states. Information technologies can empower ordinary citizens and contribute to transnational and supranational structures that bypass the state. • Telecommunications are contributing to the development of global cultural integration. This process may hold the potential for the development of a single world culture. However, some politicians and citizens worry about cultural imperialism—that such a culture would be too strongly dominated by the United States. • Transnational communities are developing in areas such as sports, music, and tourism. Such communities may foster supranational identities that could compete with the state for the loyalty of citizens someday. (Comment on this)